Abstract. When workers' investments in firm-specific skills are non-contractible underinvestment may occur because of holdup. Up-or-out contracts can potentially solve this problem by limiting the firm's scope for opportunistic behavior. The downside of such contracts is that a worker who does not make the grade is dismissed even if his social value within the firm exceeds his social value outside the firm. Promise of promotion contracts, on the other hand, never result in inefficient separations. But with such contracts it might be impossible to provide the proper incentives to invest. In many circumstances the choice between these two types of contract represents the trade-off between efficient investment and efficient job assignment.
Introduction
Employers and workers typically invest jointly in training. Often the skills acquired through training are valued more highly within than outside the firm where the training takes place. If that is the case (part of) the return on the investment in training will be lost when the parties separate. An important question is then in what ways both the employer and the worker can protect their investment. The theory of contracts offers several solutions to this hold-up problem, which apply in a number of different settings. These solutions include, for instance, breach penalties like expectation damages and specific performance (i.e. the worker is not allowed to leave), and commitments on the side of the employer to either promote the worker or dismiss him after a probation period (up-or-out rule) . Theoretically these contractual solutions may be efficient, but an important question remains how they perform in practice. This paper reports about an experiment focusing on a situation in which (only) the worker invests in firm-specific training. These investments are not verifiable for a third party, in particular a court, and are therefore non-contractible. As a result, the labor contract cannot enforce a desired level of investment directly by simply specifying it in the contract. Without any further arrangement the firm and the worker are caught in a two-sided incentive problem. If the worker acquires the skills the firm has no reason to reward them, and if the firm pays in advance for the acquisition of skills, the worker has no incentive to acquire them. For this particular setting two (implicit) contract forms received considerable attention in the literature: promise of promotions and up-or-out contracts.
1
An up-or-out contract explicitly prohibits the firm to keep a worker in the same job after a probation period. She either has to promote or dismiss him. This effectively reduces the employer's possibilities for opportunistic behavior and, in that way, protects the initial investment of the worker. Theoretically, then, there will be no underinvestment under such a contract. Up-or-out contracts are observed in practice in academics (tenure track positions) and in partnerships in law and accounting firms.
Although up-or-out contracts may solve the hold-up problem by introducing some rigidity in the employment relationship, in the case of uncertainty the very same rigidity may lead to another type of inefficiency. When it is a priori not certain that a trained worker is always eligible for being promoted (for instance, because the training might not always be successful), it may turn out ex post that it is best to keep the trained worker in the same job after all. Under an up-or-out contract this is not possible. Typically, the worker will have to leave the firm to work in a job that generates a lower social value. Thus, the up-or-out contract may lead to job assignment inefficiency. The latter type of inefficiency does not exist, at least theoretically, when only a verbal promise is made to promote the worker after successful training. Such a promise of promotion contract does not explicitly rule out the possibility of keeping the worker in the same job. Under this type of contract job assignment will be efficient. But if the promise to promote the worker is not credible, the worker will anticipate opportunistic behavior of the employer and underinvest from a social point of view. In short, there may be a trade-off between investment and job assignment inefficiency when choosing between an explicit up-or-out rule and a simple (verbal) promise of promotion (cf. Gibbons, 1998) . This trade-off is conveniently summarized in the following Whether the two promotion rules work as theory predicts, is an empirical issue. By the very nature of the issues involved, it is, however, extremely difficult -if not impossible -to gather the field data necessary to test the theoretical predictions. First, the models are motivated by the fact that skill acquisition is not verifiable by a third party. Normally the term third party refers to a court. But if a court cannot verify the acquisition of skill, why should the empirical researcher be able to do so? Second, even if it is possible for a researcher to observe the skill level of a worker in a specific job, it would be much harder to determine what the skill level of that same worker would have been in another job, or what a worker who has been dismissed would have produced within the firm.
With this kind of data problems hampering the test of a theory, laboratory experiments offer an attractive alternative. In experiments almost everything is under the control of the researcher. More specifically, the worker's investment decision is observed and the payoffs of different alternatives are set by the researcher.
The experiments reported in this paper are designed to consider the extent of and the trade-off between investment inefficiency and job assignment inefficiency under the two contractual arrangements considered. In particular, we address the question of how the two contracts perform in practice on the two efficiency accounts presented in Table 1 . Our main findings are that up-or-out contracts perform by and large as theory predicts. That is, there is almost no investment inefficiency and job assignment is inefficient. In contrast, promise of promotion contracts perform better than predicted. The investment inefficiency is much smaller than theory predicts, while assignment efficiency is only somewhat below the predicted level. We argue that the efficiency improvement under promise of promotion contracts can be attributed to reciprocity considerations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a description of a general model which nests simplified versions of Kahn and Huberman's (1988) up-or-out model and Prendergast's (1993) promise of promotion model as special cases. This setup is inspired by the versions of these models discussed in Gibbons (1998) . Then Section 2 continues by characterizing the two contracts and derives their theoretical efficiency implications. In Section 3 the design of the experiments is described and the theoretical predictions are stated. In Sections 4 and 5 results of the experiments are presented and discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2
The model
The basic setup
Consider the following two-player game between a male worker and a female employer. The worker may either be of low or of high productivity, with actual productivity unknown to both players at the start of the employment relationship. By investing in firm-specific human capital (i.e. training), the worker increases the probability that he will appear to be of high productivity. The costs of investment in training are denoted c, with c>0 by assumption. These costs are born by the worker; for instance they reflect the worker's opportunity costs of leisure. Let p n (1-p n ) denote the probability that the worker is of high (low) productivity when he does not invest in training, and let p t (1-p t ) represent the probability that he is of high (low) productivity when he does invest in training. Then we have p t >p n by assumption. After the worker's investment decision, the worker's actual productivity is revealed to both players and the firm assigns the worker to one out of three possible jobs. Two jobs within the firm where the training takes place and one outside this firm. The two jobs within the firm differ in their difficulty. In particular, there is an easy job and a difficult job within the training firm. The social surplus generated by the worker in each of the three possible jobs is represented in Table 2.   2   Table 2 . The social value of the worker low productivity high productivity Up (difficult job within firm) 0 x+v Stay (easy job within firm) x x+λv Out (leave firm; job outside firm) r r additional assumptions: x,v,r≥0, and λ∈(0,1)
The social value of a low productivity worker in the difficult job is normalized at zero. What is important is the assumption that a low productivity worker generates a higher social value in the easy job than in the difficult job. Throughout the paper we assume that investments in training are socially efficient. This comes down to making the following assumption:
2 The up-or-out contract model of Kahn and Huberman (1988) contains only one job within the firm besides an outside option. The setup in which Prendergast (1993) considers promise of promotion contracts, on the other hand, does not incorporate an outside option but contains two different jobs within the training firm instead. To study both contracts within a single framework it then seems most natural to consider three possible job assignments for the worker, viz., the Up, Stay and Out option represented in Table 2 . The usual up-or-out contract and the promise of promotion contract emerge as special cases of this more general model by setting particular wage levels for the difficult and easy jobs within the firm (see below).
(A0) (p t -p n )(x+v -max{x,r}) > c Investment in training is socially efficient Efficiency requires not only that the worker invests (given A0) but also that -after his productivity is revealed -he is assigned to the task where he is most productive. A high productivity worker should be assigned to the difficult job within the firm (x+v>x+λv if λ<1, and x+v>r because of (A0), c>0 and p t >p n ). A low productivity worker should be assigned to the easy job within the firm if x>r and be dismissed if x<r. In that way an efficient allocation reaches maximal expected social surplus. Under A0 maximal expected social surplus (S*) equals: S* = p t (x+v) + (1-p t )max{x,r} -c Maximal expected social surplus
The level of S* specified above will be used in the sequel as a benchmark to assess the performance of the contractual arrangements considered.
In this paper only a specific type of contracts will be considered, namely those contracts where the employer can commit herself to attach fixed, possibly different, wages w e (easy job) and w d (difficult job) to the two jobs within the firm. In that case, when the worker works for the firm the employer gets that part of social surplus that is not taken by the worker. That is, she gets social surplus generated by the worker in the particular job assigned (cf. Table 2 ) minus his wage in this job. In case the worker does not work for the firm, the worker gets his complete social value r and the employer gets nothing. To obtain the net payoffs of the worker the costs of training (c in case of investment, 0 otherwise) have to be subtracted from his gross payoffs.
Within this set of fixed wage contracts the employer can only choose between two given combinations of (w e ,w d ). These two combinations correspond to the up-or-out contract U≡(w e U ,w d U ) and the promise of promotion contract P≡(w e P ,w d P ). The order of play in the game can now be summarized as follows:
1. The employer chooses the two wage levels w e and w d . In particular, the employer chooses between the two wage combinations U and P; 2. The worker chooses whether to invest in training or not, and this choice is observed by the employer; 3. Uncertainty is resolved and the worker's productivity is revealed to both players; 4. The employer chooses a proposal from the Up, Stay and Out options; 5. The worker decides whether to accept the employer's proposal or to quit (reject the proposal). In case the employer offers Out, quitting and accepting the proposal lead to the same outcome.
The worker's acceptance decision at stage 5 determines the outcome of the game, after which the players obtain their payoffs. This completes the description of the model considered. Next we characterize the two contracts U and P more precisely by specifying the conditions that the two wages within each of the two combinations have to satisfy. We also derive the efficiency properties of the two contracts.
Definition of the two contracts
In this subsection we discuss what exactly distinguishes an up-or-out (U) contract from a promise of promotion (P) contract in the setup of the game described above. According to Kahn and Huberman (1988, p. 424 ) the important characteristic of an up-or-out contract is that it contains "..provisions for firing individuals that do not make the grade". It typically refers to the case where dismissal (layoff) is involuntary. An up-or-out contract is therefore a contract "..in which wages [in certain instances] exceed productivity and termination is involuntary on the part of the worker." (cf. Kahn and Huberman, 1988, p. 432) . In our setting this corresponds with requiring that under a U contract employment varies with productivity, such that the worker is dismissed when his productivity is low and is promoted only if his productivity is high. In contrast, in the promise of promotion setup of Prendergast (1993) it is assumed that the worker is always retained. He cannot quit and cannot be dismissed. Therefore, in the general setup a P contract can be characterized as a contract under which the worker always works for the training firm, irrespective of his actual productivity. When his productivity turns out to be low he is kept in the same job. When he appears to be of high productivity he may be promoted when this is in the firm's interest. 3 In short, the crucial difference between the two types of contract is the induced retention decision of the employer when the worker appears to be of low productivity. Gibbons (1998) depicts, in the spirit of Kahn and Huberman (1988) , an up-or-out contract as a contract in which w e =w d >x. In that case the employer is indeed not willing to keep the worker when he appears to be of low productivity. Such a worker will be dismissed by a profit-maximizing firm. On the other hand, the promise of promotion contract is seen as a commitment to have w e ≤x,w d to induce the employer to retain even the low productivity worker (in the easy job). In this paper we follow Gibbons and use similar characterizations of the U and the P contract, respectively. In sum, the following definition will be used throughout the sequel: Definition 1. A fixed wage contract (w e ,w d ) is defined as an up-or out (U) contract when w e =w d >x. A promise of promotion (P) contract is a fixed wage contract in which w e ≤x,w d and, moreover, w e ≥r whenever x>r.
Note that either an easy job wage of w e >x or a wage of w e <r effectively deletes the Stay option for the low productivity worker. In the first case the employer rather prefers to dismiss the low productivity worker than to offer him the easy job, whereas in the second case the worker prefers to quit. In particular, note that were w e <r allowed for when x>r in a P contract, this contract could actually function in a similar way as a U contract by effectively ruling out the possibility of retaining the low productivity worker in the easy job. Definition 1 therefore also explicitly excludes this latter possibility in the case of a P contract. Note that when x<r, any fixed wage contract (w e ,w d ) effectively rules out retention of the low productivity worker because no wage satisfying w e <x and w e >r can be found.
2.3
Efficiency properties of the two contracts
We next consider the issue of how both types of contract perform theoretically. In particular, for each type of contract it has to be determined whether theoretically the wages w e and w d can be chosen such that the contract induces an efficient outcome in equilibrium (with, of course, for each of the two respective contracts the choice of (w e ,w d ) restricted according to Definition 1). 4 Generally speaking, a U contract may solve the hold-up problem, but may create inefficient separations when Stay is the socially optimal choice ex post. Under the P contract the Stay option is not effectively deleted for the low productivity worker. Hence, in contrast to a U contract there is no job assignment inefficiency. However, the contract may lead to hold-up when it cannot simultaneously make the employer's promise of promotion (from Stay to Up) in case productivity is high credible and provide the worker with sufficient incentives to invest.
Full efficiency requires that workers invest (because of A0), that high productivity workers are assigned to the difficult job within the firm, and that low productivity workers are assigned to the easy job within the firm if x>r and are dismissed if x<r.
Under an up-or-out contract workers invest if (p t -p n )(w d -r)≥c, high productivity workers are assigned to the difficult job if x+v≥w d and low productivity workers are dismissed (because w e >x). By setting w d =x+v (typically, a choice of w d strictly below but sufficiently close to x+v will work), high productivity workers will be promoted. With this wage level for the difficult job, A0 ensures that the condition for workers to invest (p t -p n )(w d -r)≥c, is satisfied. Hence, it is always possible under the U contract to obtain efficient investments. Dismissal of low productivity workers is efficient only if x≤r. Hence it is impossible to obtain full efficiency under an up-or-out contract if x>r (and p t <1). The efficiency loss is then caused by inefficient job assignment.
Under a promise of promotion contract workers will invest when (p t -p n )(w d -w e )≥c and the promise to promote is credible. Firms promote high productivity workers when (1-λ)v≥(w d -w e ), and low productivity workers will always be retained when this is socially optimal (x≥r), because w e ≤x. By setting w d sufficiently close to w e , high productivity workers will be promoted. Hence it is always possible under the P contract to obtain efficient assignment. A small difference between w d and w e , however, may give the worker insufficient incentives to invest. It is only possible to give the worker sufficient incentives to invest and the firm sufficient incentives to promote high productivity workers if (1-λ)v≥c/(p t -p n ). Hence, it is impossible to solve the two-sided incentive problem and obtain full efficiency under the P contract if (1-λ)v<c/(p t -p n ). The efficiency loss is then caused by inefficient investment levels.
Since we are interested in the trade-off between investment efficiency and assignment efficiency under the two contracts, we will assume in the remainder of this paper that the following two conditions hold: (A1) x>r and p t <1 Dismissing low productivity workers is inefficient (A2) (1-λ)v < c/(p t -p n ) Two-sided incentive problem cannot be solved under P contract
The first condition ensures that assignment of low productivity workers is inefficient under the U contract. The second condition implies that investment under the P contract is inefficient.
Although the U and P contracts as defined in Definition 1 do not cover all possible wage combinations (w e ,w d ), they capture all combinations that are relevant from an efficiency perspective. That is, there does not exist a wage combination (w e ,w d ) that is neither a U contract nor a P contract according to Definition 1, and that leads to a larger expected social surplus in equilibrium than the best among these two contracts.
5 Therefore, when both A1 and A2 hold we inescapably have a trade-off in equilibrium between investment efficiency and job assignment efficiency. This trade-off can be fully captured by the choice between the U and the P contract.
2.4
Non-optimal promise of promotion contracts
So far, we have dealt with optimal contracts. Optimal in the sense that wage levels are chosen such as to maximize expected social surplus in equilibrium, subject to the restrictions imposed on this contract by Definition 1. More specifically, although efficient investment cannot be induced under the optimal P contract and thus full efficiency is unattainable, we have considered the case where the difference between w d and w e is small enough to accomplish efficient job assignment. Alternatively, assume that (while A2 continues to hold) the difference between w d and w e is large enough to have (p t -p n )(w dw e )≥c. In principle then, it is worthwhile for the worker to invest. In that case, however, the firm will not promote workers who turn out to be of high productivity. In other words, the firm's promise of promotion is not credible. In such a setting the promise of promotion contract is no longer optimal. Because the promise of promotion is not credible workers who anticipate this will still not make the investment and therefore the investment inefficiency remains. In addition, because the wage differential between the difficult and easy jobs is too large, the firm will no longer assign high productivity workers to the difficult jobs. Job assignment is no longer efficient. Promise of promotion contracts containing a non-credible promise result in a lower social surplus than P contracts that do not contain such a promise. Nevertheless, promise of promotion contracts are typically assumed to induce inefficient investment precisely due to the problem of a noncredible promise. This for instance applies when the employer is in fact simply generating different job titles for almost identical jobs, such that ".. the firm has no incentives to promote after training." (cf. Prendergast, 1993, p. 534) . From this perspective it seems also of interest to study the case of such nonoptimal promise of promotion contracts. As argued above, this contradicts with inducing the most efficient job allocation because theoretically the worker is never assigned the difficult job. The particular non-optimal promise of promotion contract which we will consider is reflected in the following definition.
Definition 2.
A non-optimal promise of promotion contract -denoted with the lower case letter p -is a P contract that satisfies the additional restrictions (i) w d -w e >(1-λ)v and (ii) (p t -p n )(w d -w e )≥c.
Due to condition (i) in Definition 2, the promise of promotion is not credible in a p contract. However, were the worker nevertheless be convinced that the promise would be kept by the employer, then he has an incentive to invest due to condition (ii). In the p contract the worker is theoretically always assigned the easy job (given this characteristic, the p contract could alternatively be referred to as a stay-or-stay rule), and he therefore never invests under such a contract.
Surpluses and payoffs
We close this section with giving the expressions for the predicted expected social surpluses and payoffs to the employer and the worker generated by the different contracts. 
e p =x+λvp n -w e w p =w e where S*≡pt(x+v)+(1-pt)x-c is the maximal social surplus
From the expressions in the first column, we can derive that: S U >S P iff (p t -p n )v-c>(1-p t )(x-r). That is, the expected social surplus generated under the U contract exceeds the expected social surplus under the P contract if the net social gain of investment exceeds the expected social loss due to dismissing low productivity workers. The net social gain of investment corresponds to the investment inefficiency under the P contract. The latter term corresponds to job assignment inefficiency under the U contract. Further S U >s p iff (p t -λp n )v-c>(1-p t )(x-r). This expression has a similar interpretation. Finally, S P >s p iff λ<1 and vp n >0, which by assumption is always the case.
Experimental design and predictions
This section consists of three parts. In the first subsection we discuss the choice of parameter values used in the experiment. The next subsection gives an overview of the different experimental treatments and sessions. The final subsection discusses the predictions of subgame perfect game theory and reciprocity theories.
Choice of parameters
To convert the general model set out in section 2.1 into an experiment, we have to choose specific values for the model's parameters. Nine parameters have to be chosen: p t , p n , v, x, r, c, λ, and w d and w e . The first seven are the same for different contracts, only wage levels vary across contracts. The actual choice of parameters is led by the following conditions and considerations. 1. A0; to have that investment is socially efficient; 2. A1 and p t <1; to have assignment inefficiency under the U contract; 3. A2 to have investment inefficiency under the P contract; 4. S U >S P ; hold-up problem is assumed to be larger than assignment inefficiency 5. E U >E P ; in order to align the firm's preferences with social preferences; 6. p n >0; otherwise the investment choice is a choice between a risky and a certain alternative.
Based on these considerations, the following choices for the basic parameters are made: p t =¾, p n =¼, r=0, x=100, v=120, c=25, and λ=5/8. They are used throughout all the experiments. Different contracts now correspond to different wage levels attached to the two jobs within the firm. For all three contracts we have chosen the same wage level in the difficult job, viz. w d =110. Contracts thus only differ in the experiments in the wage attached to the easy job. Wages have to be chosen such that they provide the proper incentives for investment and (non-credible) promotion. For the U contract we have chosen w e =110, for the P contract w e =70, and for the p contract w e =50. The next three tables give the resulting payoffs for the firm and the worker under the three different contracts. For our choices of parameters the employer theoretically prefers the p contract over the P contract. As we do not consider a treatment with a direct choice between P and p this does not matter. An advantage of our parameter choices is that the P and the p contract now only differ in the wage attached to the easy job w e , with this wage then necessarily smaller in the p contract to satisfy the definitions of these contracts.
Treatments and sessions
200 subjects participated in total in 10 sessions. The subject pool was the undergraduate student population of the University of Amsterdam. Most of them were students in economics (66%). They earned on average 44 Dutch guilders (approximately US$ 22) in one and a half hour.
In each session there were 20 participants. 10 subjects were assigned the role of employer, the remaining 10 were assigned the role of worker. In each session each participant kept the same role, either employer or worker, during the whole session. The roles were communicated only after the complete instructions were read and understood. The experiments took place in a computer laboratory in which subjects are separated through cubicles. The only way in which subjects can communicate is by means of a computer network. Subjects do not know with whom they are connected.
The design of the experiment covers eight treatments. The first three treatments consider the three contracts (U, P, and p) in isolation. In these treatments the first stage of the game model of Section 2.1 is skipped and the type of contract is set exogenously by the experimenter. The experimental game thus starts with the investment decision of the worker. In treatments 4 and 5, the employer has a real choice at the first stage, between U and P, and U and p, respectively. Finally, treatments 6, 7 and 8 consider adjusted versions of the treatments with the U contract in isolation, the p contract in isolation, and the U vs p contracts. The adjustment relates to the information available to the subjects. More specifically, the employer does not observe the worker's investment choice, but does observe the worker's productivity level. Below we elaborate on the motivation for these asymmetric information treatments.
The mapping of the 8 treatments onto 10 sessions is represented in Table 5 . In session 1, subjects played 10 times the U contract in isolation, followed by 10 times the P contract in isolation and finally they played 10 times the game including the choice between the U and P contracts. Session 2, is identical except that the order of the isolated U and P contracts is revered. Sessions 3 and 4 are exact copies of sessions 1 and 2, but now the P contract is replaced by the p contract. Thus, in the first four sessions the same subjects are involved in three different treatments. The motivation for this is twofold. First, this is allows us to test differences in investment decisions between contracts on a within subject basis. This reduces selectivity bias in the subject pool when comparing different treatments. Second, this set-up gives the subjects sufficient experience with the various contracts available before they actually have to choose between them.
In sessions 1-4 ,we used a rotating scheme with two groups of ten subjects. During 10 rounds each subject from one group met each subject from the other group once. Between treatments the rotating scheme was changed in order to establish that subjects were not matched in the same order to other subjects. Subjects were informed about these features of the rotating scheme. 10 rounds U; 10 rounds P; 10 rounds U vs. P 10 rounds P; 10 rounds U; 10 rounds U vs. P 10 rounds U; 10 rounds p; 10 rounds U vs. p 10 rounds p; 10 rounds U; 10 rounds U vs. p The firm's choice of contract in the last 10 rounds of the sessions 1 to 4 is likely to depend on the experiences during the first 20 rounds. In order to control for learning effects sessions 5 to 8 were held. These 4 sessions consider the single treatment with an endogenous choice between contracts. Sessions 5 and 6 consider the choice between the U and P contracts, while sessions 7 and 8 deal with the choice between the U and p contracts. We ran two times two identical sessions to obtain sufficient observations. With 30 rounds, 10 workers and 10 employers it is impossible to accomplish that subjects are not matched to each other more than once. The rotation scheme used in these sessions guarantees that matchings were kept at a minimum. Again, subjects were informed about these characteristics of the rotation scheme.
In the original model of Kahn and Huberman (1988) only the worker observes the training level chosen, and only the employer observes the worker's productivity. In our basic set-up these two aspects are publicly observed. As Malcomson (1997 Malcomson ( , p. 1946 correctly notes, this difference does not matter theoretically. Predictions based on subgame perfectness are the same whether these aspects are privately or publicly observed. All that matters is that neither the investment level nor the worker's productivity is verifiable in court, such that enforceable contracts on these aspects cannot be written. On the other hand, reciprocity considerations (which are discussed in the next subsection) suggest that outcomes may substantially differ under the two information conditions. Therefore, we consider private information treatments as well, besides the basic public information case.
A full coverage of all possible asymmetric information games would multiply the number of treatments by four. Each of the five full information treatments has three asymmetric information counterparts: (i) double asymmetric information where the firm does not observe the worker's investment choice and the worker does not observe his productivity; (ii) one-sided asymmetric information where the firm does not observe the worker's investment choice, and (iii) one-sided asymmetric information where the worker does not observe his productivity. Because of cost and time considerations we have chosen to consider only one type of asymmetric information for three treatments. This was decided after preliminary analysis of the results from the first four sessions. These results indicated that for the p contract outcomes deviated most from the subgame perfect predictions, both in terms of investment choices as in terms of assignment choices. As this deviation might also affect the choice between the U and p contracts, we decided to run asymmetric information treatments for the U contract, the p contracts and the U vs. p contracts. In order to keep the experimental setup as much comparable as possible, and to keep the focus on the propensity to invest in firm-specific training, only the one-sided private information where the firm does not observe the worker's investment choice was considered. Productivity is publicly observed. The three asymmetric information treatments were held in sessions 9 and 10, which copy sessions 3 and 4 with the difference in information condition. 6 The experiment is computerized. Subjects start with on-screen instructions. All subjects have to answer some questions correctly before the experiment starts. For example, they have to calculate the earnings of subjects for some hypothetical situations. Subjects also receive a summary of the instructions on paper. A translated copy of this hand-out is attached as Appendix A6. The instructions and the experiment are phrased as neutral as possible; words like opponent, game, and player are avoided. At the start of a game all subjects receive a message which informs them about their role (worker or employer). After the subjects have played 30 games, they fill out a short questionnaire. At the end of the experiment the earned experimental points are exchanged for money at a rate of 1 point=1 eurocent. Subjects are paid individually and discretely.
3.3
Predictions based on game theory and reciprocity
Predictions based on subgame perfection
Predictions of the outcomes for each of the three contracts based on subgame perfectness are summarized in Table 6 (see also sections 2 and 3.1). In all contracts the prediction is that workers accept Up or Stay offers (acceptance or rejection of a Out offer is irrelevant).
The subgame perfect prediction in the treatments 'U or P' and 'U or p' is that the employer always chooses the U contract (because the expected payoff for the employer is larger in the U contract than in the P or p contract). Game theoretical reasoning leads to point predictions of behavior. However, it is not reasonable to expect that subjects in experiments make no errors at all. Therefore in the analyses we will also study the corresponding comparative statics:
• Investment is higher under the U contract than under the P and p contracts.
• A smaller fraction of high productivity workers is promoted under the p contract than under the P and U contracts.
• A smaller fraction of low productivity workers is dismissed under the P and p contracts than under the U contract.
• Investment inefficiency is larger under the P contract than under the U contract.
• Assignment inefficiency is larger under the U contract than under the P contract.
• Total inefficiency is larger under the p contract than under the U and P contracts.
• Employers more often prefer the U contract than the P and p contracts.
Predictions based on reciprocity
The above predictions are all based on subgame perfectness and match the predictions in the relevant theoretical literature. A large body of earlier experimental studies strongly suggests, however, that subjects may also be motivated by considerations as altruism, equity, fairness etc.. In the context of contract enforcement, especially the experimental results of Fehr et al. (1997) seem relevant. Their results suggest that potentially reciprocity might matter, and may lead to different predictions than the subgame perfect game theory. 7 To give an example, consider the treatment in which the employer chooses between U and p. Theoretically, the employer should choose the U contract because this is the best contract available. However, the following "implicit contract" is possible: the employer chooses the p contract in the expectation that the worker invests. The worker in turn invests in expectation that he will be promoted when appearing of high productivity (although the promise of promotion is formally not credible). The worker indeed has an incentive to invest when the employer (irrationally) promotes him when he is of high productivity, but not so when he does not promote the worker after all. If the players stick to this implicit contract, they are both better off than under the U-contract and social surplus is maximized. Reciprocity is thus very interesting because it directly relates to the efficiency of particular types of contract in practice.
Unfortunately, there seems to be no single, clear cut and commonly accepted definition of reciprocity, although the general idea is rather straightforward. In the words of Gächter and Fehr (1998) "[b] eing motivated by reciprocity means that one is willing to forgo some money in order to punish behavior that is considered as unfair and to reward behavior that is considered as fair". And, in Fehr et al. (1997) , " [T] he essential feature of reciprocity motives is thus a willingness to pay for responding fairly (unfairly) to a behavior that is perceived as fair (unfair)." Due to this willingness to pay to enforce fair behavior, reciprocity might be capable of mitigating a contract enforcement problem. Thereby reciprocity may be efficiency enhancing. 8 The main problem with formulating predictions based on reciprocity is that it is in many circumstances unclear when an action will be considered as fair or unfair. For instance, in the up-or-out contract analyzed in this paper, should it be considered fair if the worker invests although this action is in his own best interest? Or alternatively, is it unfair if the worker does not invest or is that just stupid because not investing does not only reduce the firm's expected payoff, but also that of the worker? To consider the consequences of being motivated by reciprocity in our game we first have to define what is considered fair and unfair. 9 In the view of Fehr et al. (1997, p. 839) whether an action is perceived fair or unfair depends on the distributional consequences of the action relative to a neutral reference action. Since the game theoretical equilibrium prediction lacks any kind of (positive or negative) reciprocity it seems a priori a good source for such neutral reference actions. However, we will also consider other reference actions. As Gächter and Falk (1998) argue the reference standard may itself be affected by the history of a relationship, behavior in other similar situations, or the institutional environment (and individuals may also have different reference standards). For each of the treatments considered the first action chosen in the game serves as a starting point for our reasoning. Given the sequential nature of our game, the focus is on intentionality rather than on distributional considerations (cf. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998 , Offerman, 1998 , Rabin, 1993 .
Apart from the problem of choosing the appropriate reference action, there are other problems as well. In practice, subjects may have different notions of fairness and have different preferences for reciprocal responses (cf. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998 , and the empirical evidence in Fehr et al., 1993 Fehr et al., , 1998a . This turns tests to falsify hypotheses based on reciprocity somewhat into shooting on a moving target. Nevertheless we think it is worthwhile to spell out predictions based on reciprocity. Table 7 shows several possible reciprocal actions in the different contracts. Positive reciprocity can occur when 'no investment' is considered the neutral reference action and the employer 7 In essence, the setup of the model of Section 2 corresponds with the strong reciprocity treatment in Fehr et al. (1997) in which both the worker and the employer can react reciprocally. In case we exogenously fix stages 4 and 5 at the game theoretical solution the weak reciprocity treatment of Fehr et al. (1997) , where only the worker can react reciprocally, pertains. 8 The closely related concept of trust is similar to reciprocity. In the words of Berg et al. (1995, p. 126) : "Trust can be defined in terms of the following two actions: first, the trustor gives a trustee the right to make a decision; and, second, the trustee makes a decision which affects both trustor and trustee. Subjects have used trust to facilitate exchange if the following conditions are met. (1) Placing trust in the trustee puts the trustor at risk; (2) relative to the set of possible actions, the trustee's decision benefits the trustor at a cost to the trustee; and (3) both trustor and trustee are made better off from the transaction compared to the outcome which would have occured if the trustor had not entrusted the trustee." And, "..trust is understood as a reliance on the reciprocity of others where a return is made for something done or given." 9 In Fehr et al. (1997) and Gächter and Fehr (1998) what should be seen as fair behavior is actually defined within the labor contracts they consider. In their setup effort cannot be enforced above some minimum effort level e min . The labor contract then specifies a wage and a desired effort level ê. This desired effort level effectively anchors fair behavior.
rewards workers who did invest by offering Stay in the U contract (PRU) or Up in the P or p contract (respectively denoted PRP and PRp). If 'investment' is considered the neutral reference action when the U contract applies, the employer can punish a worker who did not invest by dismissing him when he is a high productivity type (dismissing a worker who did not invest and turned out to be a low productivity worker is not considered a reciprocal action because this is the optimal action for the employer), denoted NRU in table 7. In case of the P contract, an employer can offer Stay to a high productivity worker who did not invest (NRP1). In the P and the p contract, the employer can dismiss a (low or high productivity) worker (NRP2, NRP3, NRp1 and NRp2). When Up for a high productivity worker is considered the neutral reference action in case of a p contract, the worker can act negatively reciprocal by rejecting a Stay proposal by the employer (NRp3). Table 7 shows that the relative costs of reciprocal actions differ substantially. It is reasonable to expect cheaper reciprocal actions to occur more often. More specifically, under the U contract positive reciprocity (PRU) is much more likely than negative reciprocity (NRU). Under P, investing in training is most likely supported by a mechanism where workers anticipate negative reciprocity when they abstain from investment (NRP1, NRP2). Positive reciprocity (PRP) is simply too expensive. Notice that the negative reciprocity mechanism does not require firms always to punish workers for not investing; it is sufficient if the probability of punishment is large enough to turn around the ranking of the expected payoffs from investment and non-investment.
Even under the non-optimal promise of promotion (p) contract achievement of the maximal social surplus is feasible if the incentives provided by the various reciprocity mechanisms are strong enough. Workers invest and are promoted when they appear to be of high productivity. Promotion can be either the result of positive reciprocity (reward for investment, PRp) and of negative reciprocity (worker quits if not promoted, NRp3). Since both ways to reciprocate are relatively cheap, it is fairly likely that reciprocity will be at work. We now turn to endogenous treatments. In these treatments the sequence of actions is longer, and therefore the chain of reciprocity can be longer.
U or P.
The choice of U is the game-theoretical prediction. Let this be the neutral reference action. Then, if U is chosen predictions are the same as in the case where U is exogenous. If P is chosen this can be considered as fair and the prediction under reciprocity is that the worker will invest to reward the employer. If the worker does not invest, the firm has reason to punish the worker and choose NRP1, NRP2 or NRP3. When the worker responds to the firm's choice of P by investing, the firm's fair action has been reciprocated and the firm can continue by rationally basing assignment on productivity (thus, there is now no reason for the firm to reward the worker's investment decision). If P is considered as the neutral reference action the choice of U is seen as unfair. Then the worker will not invest and is either dismissed or not promoted when being of high productivity (negative reciprocity). The choice of P then leads to the predictions under P in Table 7 .
U or p. The choice of U is the game-theoretical prediction. Let this be the neutral reference action. Then, if U is chosen predictions are again the same as in the case where U is exogenous. If p is chosen this can be considered as fair and the prediction under reciprocity is that the worker will invest to reward the firm's contract choice. If the worker does no invest, the firm has reason to choose for NRp1 or NRp2. After investment promotion will be irrationally based on productivity (recall that in p the promise of promotion is not credible). If the worker is not promoted when being of high productivity he may retaliate by quitting.
If p is considered as the neutral reference action the choice of U is seen as unfair. Then the worker will not invest and is always dismissed (negative reciprocity). The choice of p then leads to the predictions listed under p in Table 7 . Given reciprocity of the above kind, the employer will choose p.
The difference between treatment "U or P" and "U or p" (and implicitly the treatments P and p) is that the chain of reciprocal action is one step longer under the non-optimal p contract; the employer must promote the worker on the basis of productivity even though this is not profitable. The worker's choice of investment after the employer's choice of contract P might solely be a consequence of rewarding the employer for being fair (choosing P rather than U). In case of U or p the investment choice will be guided by both worker's reciprocal reaction to the employer's kind choice of contract and by the worker's anticipation of the employer's reciprocal reaction at the promotion stage.
The predictions based on reciprocity are less clear-cut as the game theoretic predictions (or stated differently; many reciprocity predictions are possible based on different assumptions of what is fair and unfair). Nevertheless, the predictions of subgame perfectness and reciprocity theories can be confronted in a more general way. By definition, subgame perfectness predicts no difference in behavior between the exogenous and endogenous treatments, while the chains of reciprocity described above suggest that endogeneity might matter.
Another interesting test is to consider the alternative setting where the employer does not observe investment levels (cf. the one-sided private information treatment). Game theoretical predictions remain exactly the same (cf. Malcomson, 1997) , but predictions necessarily change in the presence of reciprocity because the retention decision then cannot be conditional on the investment level observed any longer. Sessions 9 and 10 test these predictions.
Investment and assignment decisions under the three contracts
The presentation of the experimental results is divided into two parts. In this section we present and discuss the results for investment decisions and assignment choices for each of the three contracts separately. In Section 5 we compare these results for the three contracts and also consider the implications of investment and assignment decisions in terms of efficiency. Further Section 5 deals with the firms' choices between contracts. For expositional reasons the results of the formal statistical tests are relegated to the Appendix.
Results for the U contract
Investment behavior. According to subgame perfection workers should always invest in skill acquisition when the U contract applies. In other words, game theory predicts that the individual investment rate equals 1 for all subjects. Averaged over all treatments and sessions the mean of individual investment rates under the U contract equals 0.85. Although the exact values vary somewhat between sessions and treatments, formal tests reveal that the mean individual investment rates do not vary systematically between sessions or treatments (cf Appendix A1). Figure 1 below provides information about the frequency distribution of individual investment rates. Under the U contract, somewhat less than one half (43%) of all workers has an investment rate exactly equal to the game theoretical prediction of 1, and somewhat more than one half of them (52%) has an investment rate that exceeds 0.9. From these figures we can conclude that for a vast majority of workers the normal thing to do under the U contract is to invest. Only a very small minority of the workers frequently try their chances to see whether they are lucky to become a high productivity worker, without making the investment in skills acquisition. In sum, we conclude that by and large the subgame perfect prediction is confirmed by the data. Worker assignment: job offer and quit behavior. Subgame perfection predicts that under the U contract low productivity workers will always be dismissed, whereas high productivity workers will always be promoted. Moreover, job assignment is based on observed productivity and independent of actual investment behavior. Finally, a worker never quits when being offered Up or Stay. Given a worker's investment decision and productivity level 10 , the assignment of workers to the different job options appears to be almost identical for the endogenous and exogenous treatments of sessions 1 to 8. Assignment is somewhat different in sessions 9 and 10 where only the worker observes the investment level. Between these latter two sessions again only very small differences exist. Therefore in table 8 the observations of the full information sessions (1-8) and the private information sessions (9 and 10), respectively, are pooled. See Appendix A2 for the full table.
10 Whereas for the worker's investment decision we have enough observations per subject to calculate individual mean investment rates, this is not the case for assignment decisions. Although per subject who has the role of employer we have also 10 (or more in sessions 5-8) observed assignments per treatment, these can not be averaged since assignment is conditional on investment choice and productivity realization (and in the endogenous treatments on contract choice as well). The number of observations per subject is too small to meaningfully calculate average assignment choices conditional on these choices. Table 8 reveals that the majority of assignments fits the subgame perfect predictions. When the worker is of high productivity, he is almost always assigned the difficult job (Up), irrespective of whether he invested in skills acquisition or not. If the worker did not invest and turned out to be of low productivity the worker is typically dismissed, as predicted. The single contingency where the theory predicts less than (almost) perfect concerns the case where the worker is of low productivity, despite his investment in skills acquisition. Although the majority of observations (73%) is still in line with the theoretical prediction of dismissal, then in 27% of the cases the worker is offered the Stay option. These observations provide some weak evidence that positive reciprocity (PRU; cf section 3.3) may play a role; the employer is sometimes willing to forgo some money in order to reward the worker for his unsuccessful investment in skills acquisition. But, given that PRU is very cheap to the employer (it costs 10 points to give a reward of 110 points), the result that it is not observed in 73% of the cases in fact provides a rather strong result against the importance of PRU. Apparently, while some authors consider up-or-out policies a particular harsh way of dealing with employees, especially when they have collected firm-specific skills (Baker et al., 1988 , Prendergast, 1993 , employers in the experiments are prepared to dismiss their employees in order to secure a relatively small gain. Although certainly not the dominant mechanism, PRU plays some in role in the assignment of the worker. (NRU as discussed in Subsection 3.3 plays no role at all.) In order for PRU to operate it is important that firms observe the worker's investment decision. Otherwise they do not know whether low productivity is due to no investment or to bad luck. In the private information treatment is no scope for PRU because employers do not observe workers' investment decisions. Out of the 97 observations in which the worker appeared to be of low productivity, the worker is offered the Stay option in only 13 cases (13%).
11 Comparing this percentage with the 27% obtained for the full information case, we conclude that low productivity workers have a higher probability of being dismissed when the employer does not observe his investment decision, compared with the situation in which the employer observes that the worker has invested in skills acquisition. PRU thus plays some role.
Turning briefly to the observed quit behavior of the worker (see Appendix A2), we recorded only one observation that deviates from the theoretical predictions. With a single exception, workers always accepted an Up or a Stay proposal. When the worker is offered the Out option, both acceptance and rejection yields him the same utility. The choice of the worker is then immaterial. Indeed, we observe both reactions to the Out-offer quite often.
In sum, actual worker assignment under the U contract by and large confirms the subgame perfect predictions. Under symmetric and full information only 27% of the low productivity workers who invested are offered the Stay option, although this is a cheap way to positively reciprocate the investment behavior of the worker. Under one-sided private information this percentage is even lower at 13%. Comparing these two figures, it can be concluded that observed investment behavior is important for positive reciprocity observed under the U contract.
Results for the P contract
Investment behavior. In contrast to the situation under the U contract, subgame perfectness predicts no investment at all under the P contract. The reason is simply that when the latter promotion rule applies, the costs of investment exceed the expected benefits to the worker. Theoretically we thus expect (mean) individual investment rates that are equal to zero. This theoretical prediction is clearly rejected by the data. Averaged over sessions and treatments, the mean individual investment rate under the P contract equals 0.46. The actual mean investment rates fluctuate slightly between sessions and treatment, but none of the differences is significant (see Appendix A1).
Although mean individual investment rates are very stable over the different treatments and sessions, individual investment rates are very dispersed. This can be observed from Figure 1 . While under the U contract individual investment rates were very similar across individual workers, they vary widely under the P contract. Notwithstanding the large dispersion, there is a small peak in the frequency distribution near the game theoretical prediction of zero.
Given the theoretical prediction that no investments should be observed, an intriguing question becomes why workers do invest under the P contract. Reciprocity considerations might provide an explanation. As discussed in Subsection 3.3 positive reciprocity is unlikely because it is too expensive. If workers anticipate that firms punish them for not investing (negative reciprocity, NRP1, NRP2 and NRP3), non-investment becomes less attractive. The more cost-effective punishments for non-investors are dismissing a low productivity worker (NRP3) or offering Stay to a high productivity worker (NRP1). Dismissing a high productivity worker (NRP2) is relatively expensive and therefore unlikely. Whether one of these forms of reciprocity can explain the high individual investment rates observed is further pursued when we look at actual assignment behavior.
Worker assignment: job offer and quit behavior. Under the P contract, subgame perfection predicts that high productivity workers will be offered promotion, while low productivity workers should be offered the Stay option. No worker will be dismissed and, likewise, quits do not occur. Table 9 presents the realized assignment patterns. Table 9 reveals that in two out of the four relevant contingencies subgame perfection predicts less than perfect. It concerns the two contingencies (Low and High) in which the worker did not invest. These assignments correspond with the three possible forms of negative reciprocity (NRP1, NRP2 and NRP3) discussed in Section 3.3. When non-investing workers appear to be of low productivity they are in 9% of the cases punished by dismissal instead of being offered the easy job (NRP2). In 7% of the cases workers who are of high productivity although they did not invest are offered the easy job (NRP1) and in 1 case only the Out-option (NRP3) is offered. We now return to the question whether the observed tendency to reciprocate negatively is strong enough to motivate the worker's investment. Given the actual job offer patterns the expected payoff for the worker from investment equals 74.02 points, while the expected payoff from notinvesting equals 73.91. 12 The 'fictituous play' strategy against the employers' aggregate observed job offer behavior is thus by and large indifferent between investment and no-investment. As the expected payoffs of these two actions are almost identical in practice, workers should indeed be indifferent (on average) between investment and no-investment. In short, investment is not irrational at all in practice when the P contract applies, because the worker may correctly anticipate the negative reciprocal response of the employer when he would not invest.
With respect to the quit behavior of the worker, only 4 out of the in total 504-22=482 observations deviate from theoretical predictions (0.8%).
13 (see Appendix A2) The very small number of deviations indicates that reciprocity typically plays no role at all in the decision whether to quit or not.
We conclude that worker assignment is close to the theoretical predictions. The subgame perfect predictions are thus by and large confirmed for the case of the P contract. The main exception is that in 9% of the cases workers who did not invest are punished. For high productivity workers this punishment is in the form of no promotion, for low productivity workers it is in the form of dismissal. Although punishment occurs not very often, it reduces the expected payoffs from not investing enough to make them equal to the expected payoffs of investment. In that way, anticipated negative reciprocity provides an explanation for the high individual investment rates observed under the P contract.
4.3
Results for the p contract Investment behavior. When the (little) p contract applies, the employer's promise to promote a high productivity worker is not credible. Theoretically, workers will anticipate this, and will not invest. As was the case for the P contract, we therefore expect individual investment rates close to zero. This expectation is clearly invalidated by the data; averaged over sessions and treatments the mean individual investment rate under the p contract equals 0.43. There appear to be some significant differences between sessions, but the observed dispersion is not systematically related to different treatments (see Appendix A1). Like under the P contract, we again find a large dispersion in investment rates across subjects (see Figure 1) . And also for the little p contract the frequency distribution is bi-modal. It has a peak at the game theoretical prediction of zero, and a somewhat smaller peak at the completely opposite prediction of one.
High investment rates under the p contract can be supported by workers' expectations that employers will always promote high productivity workers who invested. This expectation can be supported by two types of reciprocity (cf. Subsection 3.3). First, the employer may reward the high productivity worker for making the investment, PRp. As noted in Subsection 3.3 this costs the employer only 15 points, and yields the worker 60 points. Second, the employer may anticipate negative reciprocity in the form of a quit if he does not promote the high productivity worker; NRp3. This costs the worker 50 points, and causes a damage of 125 points to the employer. Below we will consider whether actual assignment behavior is in line with reciprocity considerations of this kind.
Worker assignment: job offer and quit behavior. Subgame perfection predicts that workers are always offered the Stay option, independent of their investment and productivity. No worker will be dismissed and quits do no occur.
Under the p contract the pattern of assignment appears to depend on both the information condition (full versus private information) and on whether the exogenous or endogenous treatments are considered. We therefore present two tables, one for each information condition. Moreover, within the two tables we present the observations separately for the exogenous and endogenous treatments. (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) Note: Number of cases is printed between brackets. Bold faced numbers represent assignments in line with theoretical predictions.
We consider the full information case first. Job offers differ substantially from theoretical predictions only when the worker appears to be of high productivity. In that case he is often offered promotion, both after investment and no-investment. But, the probability that the high productivity worker is offered the Up option increases sharply in both the worker having made the investment, and the p contract being endogenously chosen by the employer. In particular, in case the p contract is exogenously given the worker is being offered promotion in 34% of the cases where he did not invest, and in 52% of the cases where he did invest. These percentages increase to 63% and 82% for the case where the p contract is endogenously chosen. Thus, an observable investment increases the promotion chances of a high productivity worker by about 20%. This can be explained by PRp: the employer rewards the worker for 'fair' behavior (see Table 7 ). The endogenous choice of the p contract increases the promotional chances of both type of workers by another 30%. 14 This observation can be partly explained by the long reciprocity chain reasoning described in Subsection 3.3 for the treatment "U or p". Overall, in the exogenous (endogenous) treatments 24% (38.8%) of the job offers differ from theoretical predictions.
We next turn to the question whether actual job offer patterns can explain the high individual investment rates observed for the p contract. To that end we calculate the expected benefits of investment and no-investment, under the assumption of 'fictituous play'. In case we focus on the exogenous treatments, the expected payoff of investment equals 48.20, and the expected payoff from not-investing equals 52.94. For the endogenous treatments these figures equal 61.68 and 59.24 respectively. These expected payoffs of investment and no-investment are not very far apart, explaining why on average workers are indifferent between investment and no investment. Note that under the p contract the theoretically expected payoffs differ substantially between investment and no-investment (25 versus 50 points). In sum, also under the p contract investment is not that irrational after all, because the worker may anticipate the positive reciprocal response of the employer when he does invest. Averaged over endogenous and exogenous treatments, this will compensate him completely for his investment costs.
For reciprocity with respect to the investment decision to operate, it is crucial that the firm observes the worker's investment choice. If the firm does not observe this choice, it is impossible for the firm to reward or punish the worker's investment behavior. Therefore, the only way in which reciprocity can operate under the asymmetric information treatments is that the firm anticipates a negative reciprocal reaction of the worker if it offers Stay rather than Up. Especially high productivity workers who do not get promoted after they invested may want to reciprocate a Stay offer by leaving the firm. In contrast to reciprocity considerations, game theoretical predictions are not affected by introducing one-sided private information. According to subgame perfection worker assignment does not depend on the investment choice but only on realized productivity. The worker should always be offered the Stay option. The lower part of table 10 lists the assignments in the one-sided private information treatments.
With one single exception out of 179 cases, the low productivity worker is offered the easy job within the firm. The high productivity worker is typically offered the difficult job. In the exogenous treatments it holds that 59% (78%) of them is promoted after having invested (not invested). With respect to the endogenous treatments these figures amount to 97% and 93%, respectively. As experimental procedures in the one-sided private information treatments were such that it was impossible for employers to observe the investment decisions of workers, the differences between investment and no-investment are due to chance. Taking these two contingencies together, the probability of being promoted is 66.3% in the exogenous treatments and 96% in the endogenous treatments (this difference is statistically significant, p=0.005). The former is consistent with anticipating negative reciprocity of the worker. That the percentages in the endogenous treatments are higher is consistent with the long reciprocity chain (cf. Subsection 3.3). Somewhat surprisingly, reciprocal job offers are more likely when the employer cannot observe the investment decision compared with the full information treatments. In a way, when investment decisions are not observed the worker can fully exploit the employer's fear of a potential quit after a Stay offer.
When looking at the quit behavior of the worker in both the full information and private information conditions (see Appendix A2), we observe that promotions are always accepted. The Stay offer is typically accepted when the worker is of low productivity; only in 4 out of 552 cases it is rejected. The very same offer is quite often rejected when the worker turns out to be of high productivity. Pooling exogenous and endogenous treatments, the probability of rejection in the full information case equals 42.2% after no-investment and 51.5% after investment. Given that these two percentages are not far apart, it does not seem to be the firm's unfair Stay proposal that triggers the worker's reaction to this proposal. For the private information case these probabilities equal 25% and 59.1%, respectively (overall 50%). Clearly, negative reciprocity plays an important role in the quit decision of the worker under the p contract. This is important for the employer to know, because when the probability of rejection exceeds 12%, it becomes rational to offer the Up rather than the Stay option. This explains why in a large majority of the cases firms offer their high productivity workers promotion rather than the same job. Notice that workers in practice reject the Stay offer far more often than is necessary to withhold the employer from opportunistic behavior.
We conclude that actual assignments under the p contract differ substantially from the theoretical predictions. Firms usually promote their high productivity workers. Because this also holds true for workers who did not invest and in the case where the firm does not observe the worker's investment, this assignment pattern is best explained by the firm's anticipation of negative reciprocity. Indeed, around 50% of the high productivity workers who are offered the same job under the p contract decided to quit. The likely promotion of high productivity workers makes the worker in practice almost indifferent between investment and no-investment, thereby explaining why investment occurs frequently under the p contract.
Comparison between the three types of contract
This section starts with a comparison of the three different contract based on the investment and assignment result presented in the previous section. Then we continue by comparing the three contracts in terms of efficiency. Finally we focus on the employer's choice between contracts and distribution of the surplus.
Investment behavior
From the overall (mean) individual investment rates reported in the previous section it is obvious that the U contract induces higher individual investment rates than the P or p contract. We tested for each individual subject differences between investment rates under the three contracts. This was done by endogeneity/exogeneity-condition and by information condition (test statistics are reported in Appendix A3). This gives the following result:
Result RI: Investment behavior. The type of contract clearly affects the investment behavior of the worker. Under the U contract subjects are more likely to invest than under the P or p contract. The propensity to invest is not affected by the endogeneity of the contract or the observability of the investment.
The point predictions based on subgame perfectness receive qualitative support from the data. Under the U contract the subjects do not always invest, but the mean individual investment rate is very high (85%). Moreover, over 75% of the workers invest almost always. However, mean individual investment rates are significantly higher than the theory predicts (0%) under both the P and the p contract and fluctuate around 45%. These higher investment rates can be explained by the actual assignment patterns observed in the lab, because the actual payoffs for the worker are almost the same with investment and without investment.
5.2 Worker assignment: job offer and quit behavior Table 12 reproduces the findings of Section 4 with respect to job assignment patterns under the three contracts. We have pooled the data from the exogenous and endogenous treatments of sessions 1 to 8. We also have pooled the data over investment and no-investment, because it is productivity and not investment that determines the surplus created by different assignments . * refers to the socially optimal assignment. Bold faced percentages are on the equilibrium path.
The figures in Table 12 can be summarized in the following result.
Result RA: Worker assignment. Promotions are significantly less likely under the p contract than under the U or P contract. Dismissals are significantly more likely under the U contract than under the P or p contract.
Under the U contract there is only a weak tendency of the employers to reward costly but unsuccessful investments by the worker (PRU in 27% of the relevant cases). The possibility to observe the worker's investment appears to be of some importance for PRU. Under the P contract there is a weak tendency to reciprocate negatively; on average 9% of the workers that did not invest are punished. For high productivity workers punishment is in the form of no promotion, for low productivity workers it is in the form of dismissal. Job offers are mostly independent of the endogeneity of the contract, although the way in which to reciprocate negatively under the P contract differs slightly between the exogenous and endogenous treatments. Quits do (almost) not occur under the U and the P contract. The high promotion rate of high productivity workers under the p contract is best explained by NRp3. Promotional chances are higher under endogenous treatments than under exogenous treatments. These higher promotion chances lead to higher payoffs for both parties. The firm gains because offering a high productivity worker the same job, may cause the worker to quit. Indeed, around 50% of these workers reject such an offer, irrespective of whether the worker invested or not. Both for the P and the p contract, the higher investment rates can be explained by (anticipated) reciprocity.
Efficiency
The actual investment and job assignment decisions under the different contracts determine the efficiency levels as well as the distribution of the realized surplus over the firm and the worker. In this subsection we consider the first aspect in more detail.
Maximal expected social surplus is realized when the worker always invests, and when the employer subsequently offers the low productivity worker the Stay option and the high productivity worker the Up option. For the parameter values used in our experiments, this maximal surplus equals S*=165 (cf. Subsection 3.1). The two sources of inefficiency are inefficienct investment and inefficient assignment. The following general procedure is used for each contract to split total observed inefficiency up into the two separate types of inefficiency distinguished. First we calculate the expected social surplus in each of the four combinations of investment choice and realized productivity, under the assumption that assignment takes place exactly according to the proportions observed in the experiments. Refer to these contingent expected (gross) social surpluses as S LowNI , S HighNI , S LowI , and S HighI , respectively. Subsequently, we calculate the expected (net) social surplus solely contingent on the workers' investment choice, making use of the theoretical probability distributions p t and p n . That is, we calculate S I Obs =¾(S HighI )+¼(S LowI )-25 and S NI Obs =¼(S HighNI )+¾(S LowNI ). The subtraction of c=25 in the expression for S I Obs is to correct for the investment costs. S I Obs and S NI Obs reflect the expected net social surplus of investment and no-investment, using the actually observed pattern of assignment. When s I is used to denote the mean investment rate, 15 we get the following expression for the average realized social surplus S Obs observed. S Obs = s I ⋅S I Obs + (1-s I )⋅S NI Obs + residual
The calculations of S I Obs and S NI Obs are based on the theoretical probabilities p t =¾ and p n =¼. The residual in the expression for S Obs is due to the fact that the empirical distributions that appear in the experiments differ slightly from the theoretically assumed distributions.
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The efficiency gains or losses that are caused by (small) differences between theoretical and empirical probability distributions cannot be attributed to the decisions of individual subjects. They are therefore not included in our measures of investment and assignment inefficiency. Pure investment inefficiency is measured as the expected loss caused by no investment, under the assumption that an optimal pattern of assignment is followed after the investment decision. The measure of pure assignment inefficiency simply assumes optimal investment behavior, and measures inefficiencies caused by non-optimal assignment by comparing actual assignment after investment with optimal assignment. Actual observed assignment patterns, however, may depend on the investment decision of the worker. In the notation introduced above, S LowNI (S HighNI ) may simply differ from S LowI (S HighI ). More importantly, even when these conditional assignment patterns are exactly equal for each type of worker (S jNI =S jI for j=low,high), the overall resulting assignment pattern will be different due to the fact that the probability of becoming a high productivity worker depends on the investment decision. 18 The third measure of inefficiency captures these latter two effects. It measures the additional inefficiency caused by non-optimal assignments after no-investment, weighted by the probability that no-investment occurs. It is referred to as a combined effect, because it is caused by a combination of a non-optimal investment decision and a subsequent non-optimal assignment pattern.
Adding the three disaggregate inefficiency terms distinguished above, we get the expression S*-(S Obs -residual); the overall inefficiency that can be attributed to deviations from socially optimal behavior. The difference (S Obs -residual) is a measure for the realized social surplus corrected for 15 The mean investment rate used here is based on the number of total interactions in which the particular contract is used in the sessions 1 through 8. This rate differs slightly from the overall mean individual investment rate as reported in Tables A2, because the latter do not take into account that different subjects may be confronted with a specific contract a different number of times. 16 One reason for this is that the number of times a particular contract is played within a session need not necessarily be a multiple of four. Moreover, although computer procedures were such that overall the empirical distributions correspond as much as possible with the theoretical distributions, the distribution of productivity outcomes over the different contracts (in the endogenous treatments) was not explicitly controlled. 17 That is, S I * =x+p t v-c=165 and S NI * =x+p n v=130. Hence, S I * -S NI * =(p t -p n )v-c=35, the net social gain of investment. 18 Put differently, even when S jNI =S jI for j=low,high, S I Obs will differ from S NI Obs whenever S Lowj differs from S Highj (due to the fact that p t =¾>¼=p n ). Certainly, S Lowj will typically be lower than S Highj , simply because maximal attainable social surplus is higher when the worker is of high productivity.
deviations of the realized probabilities from the theoretical probabilities. We refer to this as the corrected realized social surplus, and consider this to be the best measure to evaluate the contracts' efficiency performance. The procedure described above is now applied to each of the three contracts.
Starting with the U contract we obtain Table 13 . The first column gives the theoretical (subgame perfect) predictions, while the second column reports observed results. Remark: The numbers within ( ) refer to percentages of the maximal social surplus S* As the empirical distribution is somewhat more favorable (higher probability of being of high productivity, e.g. social value), the overall inefficiency observed in the lab is somewhat lower than the calculated investment and assignment inefficiencies indicate. The actual efficiency losses observed are broadly in line with the efficiency losses predicted under the U contract. The largest inefficiency is indeed due to the suboptimal assignment of low productivity workers, although the pure assignment inefficiency is not as large as predicted. Low productivity workers are usually dismissed, where it would be socially optimal to retain them in the easy job. At some instances PRU works and the employer retains the low productivity worker in the easy job. The combined inefficiency of -7.87 is caused by workers who didn't invest and who were subsequently dismissed (Out) when the appeared to be of low productivity. Table 14 reports efficiency accounting results for the P contract. Remark: The numbers within ( ) refer to percentages of the maximal social surplus S* For the P contract the observed probability of being of high productivity after investment (noinvestment) equals 71.7% (21.4%), thus somewhat lower than the theoretical probability of 75% (25%). Because the empirical distribution is thus somewhat less favorable under the P contract, the overall inefficiency observed in the lab is somewhat higher than the calculated investment and assignment inefficiencies indicate. As predicted, the largest inefficiency is caused by inefficient investments. Notably, however, the pure investment inefficiency is substantially lower than its theoretical prediction. The weak tendency to reciprocate negatively introduces a small assignment inefficiency, but by providing larger incentives to invest, reduces more on the investment inefficiency predicted. Indeed, ignoring the residual term the inefficiency loss of the P contract amounts to only 15.5%, instead of the theoretically predicted 21.2%. Theoretically the use of the p contract leads to an efficiency loss of 46¼ points, or 28.0% of S*. This loss is caused by both investment and assignment inefficiency. In considering actual observed inefficiency, we focus on the full information sessions 1 through 8. In contrast to the two other contracts previously discussed, for the p contract we do analyze the exogenous and endogenous treatments separately. In the first case the corrected realized social surplus equals 110.25, in the latter case 131.52 (the difference is significant; p=0.001). The actual efficiency loss under the p contract thus ranges from 54.75 points (33.2%) when the contract is exogenously given, to 33.48 points (20.3%) when it is endogenously chosen. In other words, when the p contract is given (chosen), it is more (less) inefficient than predicted. Remark: The numbers within ( ) refer to percentages of the maximal social surplus S* Contrary to theoretical predictions, investment inefficiency is not the main determinant of overall observed inefficiency. Especially when the p contract is exogenously given, inefficiencies are chiefly caused by inefficient assignments. Anticipated negative reciprocity in case the p contract is endogenously chosen corrects a substantial amount of these assignment inefficiencies. As the mean investment rate is not significantly affected by the endogeneity of the contract, pure investment inefficiency is about the same over the two treatments.
We can now compare the three contracts in terms of efficiency. According to the theoretical predictions the up-or-out contract should realize an efficiency level 6% and 12.8% above the two promise of promotion contracts, in practice the first promise of promotion contracts realizes (corrected for the residual) a 3.5% higher efficiency level than the up-or-out contract, while the second promise of promotion contract has an average efficiency level only 1.3% below that of the up-or-out contract. If efficiency is judged relative to the outcome supported by the subgame perfect prediction we find that the endogenous p contract performs best (110.8%), followed by the P (107.3%), the U (95.4%) and the exogenous p contract (92.8%). We can also conclude that investment (assignment) inefficiency is larger under the P (U) contract. This can be summarized in the following result.
Result RE: Efficiency. Differences between actual and predicted performance of the contracts in terms of efficiency are substantial. The U contract does worse than predicted while the P and endogenous p contracts do better than predicted. This reverses the ranking of contracts in terms of efficiency. The high realized efficiency of the P and endogenous p contracts is supported by reciprocity mechanisms.
The choice of contract
At the end of this section we turn to the analysis of the firm's choice of contract. Contract choices are only made in the endogenous treatments. When the choice is between the U and P contracts, the mean individual propensity to choose the P contract (averaged over sessions) equals 38%. When the choice is between the U and p contracts, the mean individual propensity to choose the p contract (again averaged over sessions) equals 57%. 19 In both cases subgame perfectness predicts 0%. Overall, the U contract is more often chosen than the P contract and, in stark contrast with the theoretical predictions, the p contract is more often chosen than the U contract. The high mean rates are mainly caused by the large dispersion in the individual choice rates. For both the choices P versus U, and p versus U the frequency distributions appear to be bimodal, with peaks below 0.25 and above 0.75. Hence, for both type of choices large fractions of the subjects choose often for the U contract or often for the P/p contract. Only very few subjects choose the two contracts about equally often.
Which factors determine the choice of contract? Employers will base their choices on expected actual payoffs under the different contracts. Actual payoffs may deviate from the theoretically predicted payoffs. Table 16 below provides information concerning the average net payoffs of the employer (and the worker). In line with theoretical predictions, the employer is best off under the U contract and the worker under the P contract. Formal statistical tests (see Appendix A4) reveal that both the worker's and the employer's payoffs differ significantly between the U and P and the P and p contracts, but not between the U and p contracts. According to this latter finding the employer should be indifferent between the U contract and the p contract. The finding that in 57% of all the cases the firm chooses the p contract rather than the U contract therefore comes as no surprise. But, the firm appears to earn significantly more under the U contract than under the P contract. Therefore, the finding that in 38% of the cases the firm chooses the P contract rather than the U contract is more difficult to explain. One potential explanation might be the different experiences employers gained while using the different contracts. That is, past experiences with the contracts in isolation obtained in the exogenous treatments may play a role in the actual contract choice in the endogenous treatments. This can be tested by regressing the individual choice rates for the P contract on the earnings differential between the P and U contract experienced in the exogenous treatments (including a constant term).
In sessions 1 and 2 subjects first played 10 rounds of the exogenous U treatment and 10 rounds of the exogenous P treatment. Then the played 10 rounds of the endogenous game with a choice between the U and P contracts. Regressing the frequency of employers' choices of the P contract on the difference of their earnings in the exogenous P and U treatments, shows that the earnings difference has a significantly positive effect on the frequency of the choice for the P contract. 20 This partly explains the anomaly that the P contract is often chosen. We end this section with the following result:
Result RC: The choice of contract. The subgame perfect prediction that employers will always prefer a U contract above a P or p contract, is clearly rejected by the data.
Conclusion
In this paper we reported about an experiment which was designed to study the trade-off between investment efficiency and job assignment efficiency under different promotion rules. The key finding is that in practice the rules perform differently from what theory (subgame perfectness) predicts. More specifically, up-or-out rules perform worse than predicted, while promise of promotion rules perform better. For the parameters chosen in this experiment, this different performance even reverses the efficiency ranking of the different promotion rules. The differences between theoretical predictions and empirical realizations can be explained by the fact that contracts differ in the extent that they give scope to reciprocity. In an up-or-out contract theory predicts that the worker starts with investing. If the worker does so, and the employer considers this as the neutral reference action, there is no reason for the employer to reward the investment. Consequently there is no incentive to improve upon the predicted up-or-out assignment of workers, and hence there is no mechanism supporting the assignment of low productivity workers to the easy job within the firm. In the experiments we find that only in a small number of the cases a low productivity worker is offered to stay (in the easy job). This, in spite of the fact that offering the worker to stay rather than to dismiss the worker is a fairly cheap action of to the firm. Thus, although up-or-out policies are a particular harsh way of dealing with employees, especially when they have collected firm-specific skills (Baker et al. 1988; Prendergast 1993, p. 533) , employers in the experiments are prepared to dismiss their employees in order to secure a relatively small gain.
Instead, promise of promotion contracts provide some scope for reciprocity in a way that is efficiency enhancing. The theoretical prediction is that the worker will not invest. The two promise of promotion contracts provide very different incentives to reciprocate. In the first promise of promotion contract the worker might decide to invest because he anticipates that the employer will punish non-investment by offering a less attractive job than corresponds with the worker's productivity. This mechanism does indeed operate. Non-investing workers are sometimes punished, and a substantial fraction of the workers do invest. Under the second promise of promotion contract, the worker might want to invest if he anticipates that the firm will reward that by sometimes offering a more attractive job than corresponds with the worker's productivity. This type of job assignment is further supported if the employer realizes that not offering a more attractive job can be retaliated by the worker in the form of quitting. In both cases, the reciprocity mechanisms appear to work, thereby increasing investment levels and in case of the second contract also improving assignment.
From the experimental evidence we conclude that labor contracts that provide scope for reciprocity may induce efficiency levels above the levels predicted in the theoretical literature where predictions are based on subgame perfectness. This conclusion is in line with the results of Fehr et al (1997) about the role of reciprocity in enforcement of labor contracts. The difference between the contracts studied in that paper and in the current paper, is that Fehr et al. have designed labor contracts with the explicit aim to give scope for reciprocity, while we have analyzed labor contracts that emerge directly from the relevant theoretical literature. The mean individual investment rate for the exogenous and endogenous treatment combined may differ from the simple mean of the exogenous and endogenous treatment because the number of times a contract is played in the endogenous treatments depends on the number of times this contract is actually chosen by the employers (while in the exogenous treatments each contract is played exactly 10 times). Using Mann-Whitney (rank-sum) tests, it can be verified whether significant differences exist between the individual investment rates under the exogenous treatments of the different sessions. With n sessions in which a treatment of a contract is incorporated, n*(n-1)/2 comparisons can be made. Employing a rather liberal level of significance of 10% throughout, only one out of 15 comparisons reveals a significant difference for the exogenous U contract, viz. between sessions 2 and 3 (p value=0.081). Similarly, the 45 pairwise comparisons of the individual investment rates under the endogenous treatments of the U contract also reveals only one significant difference, viz. between sessions 5 and 6 (p value=0.098).
For the P contract, individual investment behavior in the exogenous treatment of session 1 does not differ from this behavior in the exogenous treatment of session 2 (p value=0.542). Likewise, the (4*3)/2=6 pairwise comparisons of the individual investment rates under the endogenous treatments also reveal no significant differences.
Under the p contract, the statistical tests performed reveal that individual investment rates sometimes vary significantly across sessions. For instance, in session 8 investment rates are highest. In session 7 that has an identical set-up they are much lower. The observed overall dispersion, however, is not systematically related to the different treatments (exogenous or endogenous, and full or private information). The following statistical tests support these general conclusions. The 6 rank-sum tests that concern the exogenous treatments do not reveal any significant differences. The smallest p-value corresponds to the comparison of the exogenous treatment with the lowest (session 9) and the highest (session 4) mean investment rate, but is not significant (p value=0.222) . Between the endogenous treatments significant differences do exist over the sessions. In particular, the 15 pairwise comparisons of individual investment rates yield three significant differences. The individual investment rates in session 8 are significant higher than the investment rates observed in sessions 3, 7 and 10, respectively (p values equal 0.010, 0.038 and 0.052). Although the significant lower investment rates observed in sessions 3 and 10 could be attributed to the different treatments involved, the difference observed for session 7 cannot. The set-up of session 7 is namely identical to session 8. This seems to indicate that the complete session 8 is somewhat of an outlier. Indeed, when session 8 is ignored, no significant differences are found at all between the endogenous treatments.
Investment behavior also appears to be almost the same when comparing the exogenous and endogenous treatments within one session. Out of the 6, only in session 3 there appears to be a significant difference. When the U contract is endogenously chosen the propensity to invest appears to be significantly higher (Wilcoxon sign-rank test for matched pairs, p value=0.022). (The same conclusion is obtained when the first five periods of the exogenous treatment are discarded, so it seems that this difference is not caused by learning effects.) Based on these tests, we conclude that investment decisions under the U contract are typically not affected by the endogeneity of the contract. Differences between endogenous and exogenous treatments are -based on the Wilcoxon sign-rank test for matched pairs -insignificant under the P contract as well (p=0.490 in session 1 and p=0.798 in session 2). Finally, for the p contract we again find no differences between endogenous and exogenous treatments (p=0.533 in session 3, p=0.644 in session 4, p=0.671 in session 9 and p=0.716 in session 10). 
A2: Worker assignment

A3 Test of equality of investment behavior under U and P/p contracts
For each subject (with the worker role) the actual investment choices made are aggregated over the number of rounds within a particular treatment. The test of equality of investment behavior under two types of contract is then based on the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranked test. The tests indicate a significantly higher propensity to invest under the U contract than under the P (p) contract. 
A4 Testing differences in (joint) payoffs between contracts
The table below reports p-values of ranksum tests testing the hypothesis that payoffs (and efficiency levels) are equal for the three types of contract. For expositional briefness, we have pooled the data from the exogenous and exogenous treatments also for the p contract. 
A5 Differences between contract choices
Table A5 summarizes differences in contract choices between different treatments. The first row pertains to the difference between the complete and private information treatments. Clearly there is no significant difference in the frequency that the p contract is chosen between the two treatments. The second row relates to the difference between the choice for the P contract and the choice for the p contract. Here we find (at the 10% level) that the frequency that the p contract is chosen exceeds the frequency that the P contract is chosen (in both cases the alternative choice is the U contract). Stage 3: subject A makes a PROPOSAL to subject B. A may choose between three proposals X, Y and Z. The tables printed on the additional sheet handed out reflect the number of points both subjects earn according to the proposal. The number of points received depends on: the table (upper, lower) chosen in stage 1, the proposal (X, Y, Z) and the colour indicated by the disk (blue, yellow). Please note that with respect to subject B the tables reflect the GROSS EARNINGS. In case subject B has chosen disk 1at stage 2, the earnings reflected in the tables for subject B have to be reduced by 25 points. Stage 4: In this stage subject B decides whether he/she ACCEPTS or REJECTS the proposal made by subject A in stage 3. In case the proposal is accepted the earnings equal the corresponding number of points reflected in the table in question. In case the proposal is rejected the earnings for both subjects are zero. Once again, these figures represent gross earnings which for subject B have to be reduced by 25 points in case he/she has chosen disk 1.
One POINT in the experiment corresponds with one EUROCENT in money. We will use the rounded exchange rate of the euro, i.e. 100 eurocent (1 euro) equals fl. 2.20. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in guilders, based on the total number of points you earned.
Disk 1 (25 points)
Disk 2 (0 points)
